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“Theory of mind” describes the ability to impute 
mental states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, to 
oneself and to other people. Usually we want to know why 
people did what they did and we wonder what they are 
going to do next. That is, everyday we try to predict and 
explain human behaviour. In order to do this we refer to a 
person’s beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions etc. 
Behaviour is the product of belief and desire: People do 
things because they desire something and believe some 
act will achieve it. For adults it is clear that our 
assumptions about reality do not necessarily match the 
real world; but we know, regardless of whether our beliefs 
are true or not, our beliefs direct our actions. In contrast, it 
is not until the age of 4 years that children understand that 
one can be mistaken about the world and that actions can 
be based on this false belief.  
The most widely used measure for tapping these 
crucial changes in theory of mind understanding around 4 
years is the false-belief task which was first devised by 
Wimmer and Perner in 1983. In their standard unexpected 
transfer task the protagonist puts an object in location A. In 
his absence the object is unexpectedly transferred to a 
different location B. Then the protagonist returns for the 
object, and the child is asked where he will look for the 
object. In order to answer correctly children must 
understand that the protagonist will act on the basis of his 
false belief rather than on the basis of reality. That is, he 
will look in location A and not in location B where the 
object actually is. Typically children pass this kind of task 
around 4 years of age (for a review and meta-analysis, see 
Wellman et al. 2001). 
The umbrella term executive functions refers to a 
long list of higher cortical functions which enable the 
conscious control of thought and action. Ozonoff et al. 
(1991) describe executive functions as “the ability to 
maintain an appropriate problem-solving set for attainment 
of a future goal; it includes behaviors such as planning, 
impulse control, inhibition of prepotent but irrelevant 
responses, set maintenance, organized search, and 
flexibility of thought and action” (p. 1083). The anatomical 
correlate for executive functions is believed to be the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Luria 1966).  
At about the same age that children master the 
false-belief task they also improve markedly in self control: 
Around the age of 4 years children master a host of 
executive function tests. An example of these tasks is the 
Dimensional Change Card Sorting task (DCCS task; Frye 
et al. 1995) in which cards bearing pictures that vary in two 
dimensions have to be sorted first according to one 
dimension (e.g. colour) and then according to another 
dimension (e.g. shape). Two target cards, each affixed to 
one of two sorting boxes, are used. They depict for 
instance a red apple and a blue pear. The test cards (red 
pears and blue apples) match one target card on one 
dimension and the other target card on the other 
dimension. In the pre-switch phase children are told a pair 
of rules, e.g. the colour rules: They are asked to sort all the 
blue ones into the box portraying something blue and to 
sort all the red ones into the box displaying something red. 
Typically 3-year-olds have no problems when sorting the 
cards according to one dimension. In contrast, they usually 
have difficulties in the post-switch phase when the sorting 
rules change: Now the cards should be sorted according to 
the opposite dimension, e.g. according to shape. It is not 
until the age of 4 years that children continue to sort 
correctly after the sorting criterion has switched.  
That is, at around 4 years of age children improve 
markedly on theory of mind tasks (like the false-belief task) 
and executive function tests (like the DCCS task). 
Furthermore, several recent studies have demonstrated 
correlations between theory of mind tasks and executive 
function tasks in the age range of 3 to 5 years (for a 
review, see Perner and Lang 1999). Specifically, Frye et 
al. (1995) and Perner et al. (2002) have reported 
correlations between the false-belief task and the DCCS 
even when age and verbal intelligence is partialled out.  
Despite a host of correlational research, the 
specific nature of this relationship between theory of mind 
and executive functions is far from clear. Correlational 
studies cannot inform us whether this developmental link is 
causal. Therefore, in order to gain better insight into this 
developmental coincidence we put a training study into 
effect. 
 
2. Training theory of mind and executive 
functions  
After a pre-test, 44 children (22 girls and 22 boys) 
who failed one of two test questions of a false-belief task 
or sorted more than one card (of five) incorrectly in the 
post-switch phase of the DCCS were randomly allocated to 
one of three training groups matched for false-belief and 
card sorting performance. The false belief (FB) group (8 
girls and 7 boys) was trained on false-belief tasks, the card 
sorting (CS) group (7 girls and 7 boys) was given a training 
on executive functions using the DCCS, and the control 
group (7 girls and 8 boys) was trained either on relative 
clauses or on Piagetian number conservation tasks.  
Training started about one week after pre-test. 
Each child participated in two training sessions within 
approximately one week of each other. The post-test 
including three near transfer tasks (a false-belief test, a 
card sorting task and a control task) and one distant 
transfer task (a newly developed card sorting task using 
three different targets and three different test cards) was 
given about one week after the second training session. 
The pre- and post-test sessions were conducted by a male 
experimenter who was blind to the training group 
membership of the children. Training was carried out by a 
female experimenter.  
 




Figures 1 presents performance changes between 
pre- and post-test on the various tasks. The data were 
analysed in the following way: First, in each training group 
false belief performance at pre-test was compared to post-
test performance. Only the card sorting group showed a 
significant improvement achieving 36% correct at pre-test 
and 61% correct at post-test. The pre-post-comparison in 
the false belief group (pre-test: 40% correct; post-test: 57% 
correct) and in the control group (pre-test: 33% correct; 
post-test: 50% correct) failed to reach significance.  
On the DCCS task the card sorting group 
improved markedly from 29% correct sorts at pre-test to 
86% correct sorts at post-test. The pre-post-comparison 
(36% correct vs. 72% correct) was also significant in the 
false belief group. In the control group there was no 
significant difference between pre- and post-test. None of 
the training groups showed a significant improvement on 
the control task.  
On the distant transfer task, the 3-boxes card 
sorting task, children in the card sorting group performed 
better (93% correct) than the other two groups (false belief 
group: 70% correct; control group: 64% correct). But a 
significant difference was only found between the card 
sorting group and the control group. 
Concerning the card sorting training one might 
suspect that children have only acquired a simple 
response rule like: “If the experimenter suggests playing a 
new game, I have to reverse my actions.” But such a 
reversal rule cannot be applied to the 3-boxes card sorting 
post-test used as distant transfer task. Nevertheless, 
children in the card sorting group were almost perfect 
(93% correct) in this task, and they performed significantly 
better than the control group. Therefore, the transfer 
effects on the 3-boxes card sorting task suggest that 
children learned something which goes beyond the 
immediate task context.  
To summarize, this training study showed mutual 
transfer effects between theory of mind and executive 
functions, at least concerning the false-belief test as an 
indicator of theory of mind performance and the DCCS 
task as a measure of executive functions: The false belief 
training led to a significant rise in card sorting 
performance, and the executive training significantly 
increased children’s performance on the false-belief task. 
Perhaps, neither theory of mind is a prerequisite for 
executive functions nor self control is a prerequisite for 
theory of mind. In contrast, the present results support the 
existence of an underlying cognitive factor which is 
necessary for solving the false-belief test as well as for 
mastering the card sorting task. Of course, we don’t know 
what exactly children realized or learned during the 
training. But they might have become aware of the fact that 
a single entity (e.g. a certain situation or a certain object) 
can be represented in two different ways.  
 
3. The perspectival relativity of 
representations 
To master the false-belief task or the DCCS 
children must understand the perspectival relativity of 
representations. They must recognize that sometimes 
“…we hold different perspectives about the real world at 
the same time and place. The only way to bring this 
information into a single perspective is to mark the 
contents as different ways in which the world is conceived 
(represented), i.e., as different perspectives.” (Perner et al. 
2001, 5)  




To clarify, a false belief is a (mis-) representation 
of reality and must be distinguished from the correct 
representation of reality. Similarly, in the DCCS the post-
switch dimension provides a new perspective on the test 
cards which conflicts with the pre-switch dimension. In 
both tasks children must understand that one thing can be 
connected with two contradicting representations at the 
same time and place because the salience of the actual 
location of the object in the false-belief task as well as the 
salience of the pre-switch dimension in the DCCS prevent 
children from simply switching perspectives. Perhaps, this 
perspective problem (Perner et al. 2001) can explain the 
strong developmental relation between the false-belief test 
and the card sorting task.  
Further evidence for this explanation comes from 
one of our recent experiments: As noted above, in the 
standard DCCS task children must sort cards, displaying 
for example a blue apple, first according to colour and then 
according to shape. If children have difficulties describing 
this single entity (the blue apple) first as an apple and then 
as something blue, visually separating the two dimensions 
should improve their performance. Therefore, instead of 
cards with, for example, blue apples, we introduced cards 
displaying an outline of an apple next to a splotch of blue. 
We tested 32 children aged 36 to 55 months. Each 
child was given one of four different versions of the card 
sorting task: In addition to the standard version, a version 
with dimensions separated on test and target cards, a 
version with dimensions separated only on test cards and 
a version with dimensions separated only on target cards 
were used. 
If colour was detached from shape on test cards 
children performed significantly better. Separating the two 
dimensions on the target cards had no significant effect. 
Thus, children seem to focus their attention on test cards 
(which have to be sorted), and disentangling the two 
dimensions on test cards significantly enhances children’s 
ability to switch to another sorting criterion. This might be 
due to the fact that children must no longer connect one 
entity with two contradicting representations, that is, they 
must no longer distinguish between sense and referent. 
This distinction between sense and reference was 
emphasized in 1892 by the German philosopher and 
logician Gottlob Frege. He noted that “the morning star” 
and “the evening star” both refer to one and the same 
entity, to the planet Venus. These two expressions denote 
Venus in virtue of different properties that it has (being 
visible at dawn or at sunset respectively).  
According to Frege, the reference of an expression 
(e.g. “the morning star”) is the actual entity corresponding 
to it (e.g. the planet Venus). In contrast, the sense of an 
expression, the "mode of presentation", refers to the 
cognitive concept associated with this expression. This 
cognitive concept is in some way objective, it is not just a 
subjective representation held by a single individual (Frege 
1892, 29-30). Perhaps, to master the false-belief task and 
the card sorting task children must understand that one 
entity can be represented by different – in this case by 
contradicting – cognitive concepts. The contradiction 
arises from the fact that in these tasks different “modes of 
presentation” (“blue thing” vs. “apple”; “is in location A” vs. 
“is in location B”) implicate different actions.  
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